Community incidence patterns drive the risk of SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks and alter intervention impacts in a high-risk institutional setting

Optimization of control measures for severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) in high-risk institutional settings (e.g., prisons, nursing homes, or military bases) depends on how transmission dynamics in the broader community influence outbreak risk locally. We calibrated an individual-based transmission model of a military training camp to the number of RT-PCR positive trainees throughout 2020 and 2021. The predicted number of infected new arrivals closely followed adjusted national incidence and increased early outbreak risk after accounting for vaccination coverage, masking compliance, and virus variants. Outbreak size was strongly correlated with the predicted number of off-base infections among staff during training camp. In addition, off-base infections reduced the impact of arrival screening and masking, while the number of infectious trainees upon arrival reduced the impact of vaccination and staff testing. Our results highlight the importance of outside incidence patterns for modulating risk and the optimal mixture of control measures in institutional settings. DisclaimerThe views expressed are those of the authors and should not be construed to represent the positions of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the Henry M. Jackson Foundation for the Advancement of Military Medicine, Inc.

COVID-19 reopening strategies at the county level in the face of uncertainty: Multiple Models for Outbreak Decision Support

Policymakers make decisions about COVID-19 management in the face of considerable uncertainty. We convened multiple modeling teams to evaluate reopening strategies for a mid-sized county in the United States, in a novel process designed to fully express scientific uncertainty while reducing linguistic uncertainty and cognitive biases. For the scenarios considered, the consensus from 17 distinct models was that a second outbreak will occur within 6 months of reopening, unless schools and non-essential workplaces remain closed. Up to half the population could be infected with full workplace reopening; non-essential business closures reduced median cumulative infections by 82%. Intermediate reopening interventions identified no win-win situations; there was a trade-off between public health outcomes and duration of workplace closures. Aggregate results captured twice the uncertainty of individual models, providing a more complete expression of risk for decision-making purposes.